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 Abstract:  The aim of this paper is to propose a model of decision-making for 
lotteries. The key element of the theory is the use of lottery qualities. Qualities allow 
the derivation of optimal decision-making processes and are taken explicitly into 
account for lottery evaluation. Our contribution explains the major violations of the 
expected utility theory for decisions on two-point lotteries and shows the necessity of 
giving explicit consideration to the lottery qualities. 
 
Résumé:  L’objet de cette recherche est de proposer un modèle de décision pour les 
loteries. L’élément clé de la théorie est l’utilisation des caractéristiques des loteries. 
Les qualités permettent de dériver les processus optimaux de décision et sont 
explicitement prises en compte dans l’évaluation des loteries. Notre contribution 
explique les principales violations de la théorie de l’espérance d’utilité pour les   
décisions sur les loteries à deux points et montre la nécessité d’utiliser les qualités 
des loteries. 
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Over the last fifty years many theories have been proposed to explain the results of 
lottery tests (for a survey of the main results see Machina, 1987; McFadden, 1999; 
Luce, 2000). However, even for the simplest two–point lotteries, no theory is able to 
take into account all tests together. The goal of this paper is to use lottery qualities to 
build up a model that will take into account all possible tests related to both the 
pricing and comparison of two–point lotteries and, second, explain why it is optimal 
for an agent to act according to the test results. 
 
There exist two important features about lottery tests: (1) the existence of lottery 
qualities and (2) the presence of more than one cognitive process. Regarding the 
existence of lottery qualities, Tversky and Kahneman (1992), among others, have 
already tested the difference between the positive and negative qualities for 
monetary amounts xi. Prelec (1998) has pointed out the qualitative difference 
between impossibility (pi = 0) and possibility (pi ∈ ]0,1[) for probabilities, while 
Tversky and Kahneman (1979) have looked at certainty (pi = 1) as another quality. 
The presence of more than one cognitive process can be illustrated by the preference 
reversal paradox (Tversky et al., 1990, Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971), where a 
majority of subjects would prefer lottery A to lottery B in a direct choice but give a 
higher judged price to lottery B. In this choice, it was always possible for subjects to 
price each lottery first and then compare the two prices. The test result obtained 
clearly shows that individuals do not price before making their choices. We must 
then conclude that there exist at least two different cognitive processes and that 
individuals have preferences regarding these processes. In this paper, we shall 
condense the choices of all processes into one simple principle which consists in 
splitting of sets into more homogeneous subsets. 
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The concept of qualities will be shown to be useful in two different ways. First, 
qualities determine the decision process and, second, they serve as explicit elements 
in the lottery judgment. So, the role played by qualities seems strong enough to 
justify the necessity of using them. 
 
In non–expected utility (NEU) models such as Σw(pi)u(xi) (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, Edwards, 1955), pi and xi are always first evaluated with the functions w and u 
and then the summation of the different products are used to evaluate the lotteries. In 
expected utility (EU), w(pi) = pi for all i, and the same type of evaluation process is 
used for all lotteries. In this paper, we shall show that considering qualities in the 
choice process makes it possible to extend the most common models in two 
directions. First, as in the current literature, it allows individuals to make a primary 
judgment of pi and xi whenever it seems optimal. Second, individuals can use the 
product of judged pi and xi (as in NEU or EU) but again only when it is optimal. For 
example, they may also, as in Rubinstein (1988) and Leland (1994), compare the 
two pi and the two xi in some cases. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists the fourteen more problematic 
empirical facts culled from the literature on two–point lotteries and Section 3 defines 
vectors of qualities and a relation that orders these vectors. In Section 4, we use 
these two definitions to explain how the agent selects optimal processes (Definition 
4) and evaluates lotteries (Definitions 5.1 and 5.2). Section 5 presents numerical 




2.  Facts about two–point lotteries 
Notation 
The notation {a,b} is for a set and the notation (a,b) is for an ordered pair. A 
monetary amount with values in ]–∝,∝[ is denoted xi, and xi  ∈ X, the set of 
monetary amounts. A probability with values in [0,1] is denoted pi, and pi ∈ P, the 
set of probabilities. A lottery where the agent can win xi with probability pi and 0 
otherwise is denoted (pi,xi).The set of the two elements of this lottery is li = {pi,xi}. 
A lottery where the agent can win xi with probability pi and xi–1 with probability 1–pi 
is denoted (1,xi–1;pi,xi–xi–1) and li = {1,xi–1,pi,xi–xi–1}. For convenience we assume 
that xi–1< xi. This notation puts the emphasis on the fact that, when xi–1 ≠ 0, the 
agent first considers a sure monetary amount xi–1 and then a lottery (pi,xi–xi–1), 
which is almost equivalent to the concept of segregation in Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) as discussed in Luce (2000).
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The more basic tests for two–point lotteries are the judged certainty equivalent 
(subjects are asked to select a price), the choice certainty equivalent (subjects choose 
between a lottery and a sure monetary amount) and the comparison involving two 
lotteries. Almost every test involves some difficulties for theoreticians. We list 
below fourteen of the more problematic facts associated with these tests. 
 
Lotteries:  (pi,xi), xi > 0. 
Fact #1: 
In a lottery choice between lotteries A and B, if pi
A is high and pi
B is low, both 
yielding the same von Neuman–Morgenstern expected utility, a majority of subjects 




When two lotteries A and B with the same expected value are compared and the 
probabilities pi
A > pi
B are both high, a majority of subjects will choose lottery A. 
However, when both probabilities are low and the ratio pi
A/pi
B remains the same, a 
majority of subjects will choose lottery B. This is the common ratio paradox. 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; MacCrimon and Larsson, 1979). 
 
Fact # 3: 
When subjects are asked to select a price (judged certainty equivalent JCE) for the 
lotteries (pi,xi), lottery A with high probability of winning is underestimated, while 
lottery B with a low probability of winning is overestimated (Birnbaum et al., 1992). 
 
Facts #1 and #3 together lead to the preference reversal paradox. Moreover, Alarie 
and Dionne (2001) have shown that a one−parameter weighting probability function 
w(pi) is not able to explain the choices observed for these three facts involving the 




A very important point often neglected in the literature is the next one. 
 
Fact # 4: 
In comparing two lotteries, it is always possible for subjects to price each lottery 
first and then compare the two prices. But the test results (Facts #1 and #3) clearly 
imply that individuals do not price before making their choices. So we have to 
explain why pricing lotteries is not optimal when subjects face a lottery choice. 
 
Fact # 5: 
If we compare a lottery with a sure monetary amount or with a series of sure 
monetary amounts, we obtain the choice certainty equivalent CCE. Tversky et al. 
(1990) found that CCE = JCE for lotteries with high probabilities but CCE < JCE for  
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lotteries with low probabilities. We have to explain these results and why it is not 
optimal for subjects to price (JCE) first when asked to choose between a lottery with 
a high pi and a sure monetary amount (CCE). 
 
Lotteries:  (pi,xi), xi < 0. 
Fact # 6: 
One can also note that for the CCE and the common ratio paradox where xi > 0, the 
observed preferences run counter to the ones for lotteries where xi < 0 (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
 
Lotteries:  (1,xi–1;pi,xi–xi–1) xi,xi–1 > 0. 
Fact # 7: 
When pi is high, the JCE of a lottery (1,xi–1;pi,xi–xi–1) where an agent can win xi with 
probability pi or xi–1 otherwise is smaller than the JCE of a lottery (pi,xi) where the 
agent can still win xi with probability pi but 0 otherwise (Birnbaum et al., 1992). 
 
Fact # 8: 
In direct choices, the lottery (1,xi–1;pi,xi–xi–1) where an agent can win xi with 
probability pi or xi–1 otherwise is preferred to a lottery (pi,xi) where the agent can still 
win xi with probability pi but 0 otherwise. This result, opposite to that of Fact #7, 
yields another reversal of preferences (Birnbaum and Sutton, 1992). 
 
Consequently, the agent does not price the two lotteries when facing a lottery choice 
and we have to show again that the pricing of each lottery is not always optimal for 
this case. 
 
Fact # 9: 
The graph of the JCE for the lottery (1,xi–1;pi,xi–xi–1)  as a function of pi has an 
inverse S–shape like the one for the case where xi–1= 0. Moreover, xi–1 + JCE of  
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(pi,xi) ≠ JCE of (1,xi–1;pi,xi) and the difference between the two JCE decreases when 
pi increases (Birnbaum and Sutton, 1992). 
 
Fact # 10: 
For lotteries (xi, xi–1> 0) the JCE is equal to the CCE for high and low probabilities 
of gain, contrary to Fact #5 where xi–1 = 0 and xi> 0 (Birnbaum, 1992) (see Alarie 
and Dionne, 2004, for a discussion). 
 
Lotteries:  (1,xi–1;pi,xi–xi–1), xi–1 < 0 < xi. 
This subsection introduces an additional complexity, namely the presence of 
negative and positive outcomes in the same lottery. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
have already pointed out the asymmetry between these outcomes and its 
consequence for expected utility theory. Below, we present additional facts that 
show the significance of this asymmetry for lottery choices and pricing. 
 
Fact # 11: 
When an agent is indifferent to a choice between a lottery (1,xi–1; pi,xi–xi–1) and a 
sure monetary amount 0, the value of |xi–1| is a lot smaller than |xi|. This result is far 
too extreme to be explained by a wealth effect or by decreasing risk aversion as 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have pointed out. 
 
Fact # 12: 
For comparisons of lotteries with the same expected value as in Bostic et al. (1990), 
the lottery with the monetary amount xi–1 closer to 0 is always chosen. 
 
Fact # 13: 
In two of the four tests in Bostic et al. (1990) there exists a reversal of preferences, 
while there is no reversal for the other two tests. This situation is more complex than  
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the one for lotteries (pi,xi) where reversals are observed for all tests (Tversky et al. 
1990). 
 
Fact # 14: 
For this type of lottery (xi–1 < 0 < xi), CCE = JCE for high probabilities but CCE < 
JCE for low probabilities (Bostic et al. 1990). This result is like the ones for lotteries 
(pi,xi) (Fact #5) and runs counter to the ones where xi–1,xi > 0 (Fact #10). 
 
These fourteen facts strongly suggest that an evaluation function designed to take all 
of them into account simultaneously would be different from those already 
documented in the literature. This is why we analyse the processes behind the 
preferences in order to construct a unified explanation of the fourteen facts above 
listed. Then an evaluation function is derived from this analysis in Section 5. 
 
 
3. Qualities  of  lotteries 
 
We now present a model which yields optimal decision processes and takes into 
account the preceding facts. We first define the vector of qualities associated with 
any set of elements pi and xi, and then the lexicographic order relation p L used to 
compare different vectors.  
 
3.1  Vector of Qualities 
 
We described four collections of sets of qualities ℘j, j=1,...,4. They may contain the 
two sets P and X, their union and their intersection or any set of other lottery 
qualities described below, along with their unions and their intersections. In a first 
step, each group of elements pi and xi is naturally split into elements that belong 
respectively to the sets P and X defined in Section 2. So, the first collection of sets  
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of qualities becomes ℘1 = {P,X,P∪X,∅} where ∅ = P∩X. Monetary amounts can 
be positive or negative and these qualities are already mentioned in the literature 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992). So, we define two other sets: X
+ = {xi / xi ∈ ]0, ∝[} 
and X
– = {xi / xi ∈ ]–∝,0 [}. By considering the union and the intersection of these 




+,∅}. Note that xi = 0 does not belong to any 
set in ℘2 since this monetary value is considered neutral (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1992). 
 
As in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we assume that probabilities have surety (S) 
and risk (R) qualities. Prelec (1998) obtained a w(pi) function that takes into account 
the qualitative difference between impossibility (I) and risk (R). So, we define a 
partition of P as {S,R,I}: S = {1}, R = {pi/pi  ∈  ]0,1[} and I = {0}. The third 
collection of sets of qualities becomes ℘3 = {R,S,I,R∪S,R∪I,S∪I,P,∅} where P = 
R∪S∪I and ∅ = R∩S∩I = R∩S = S∩I = R∩I. We also add to the literature two 
new qualities for probabilities that indicate whether a lottery has high chances of 
winning or not. In the partition {H,L} of P, the elements of H have the high quality 
and those of L have the low quality: L = {pi/pi ∈ [0, p*[} and H ={pi/pi ∈ [p*,1]}. A 
value of p*, the fixed point of the inverse S–shape probability weighting function, 
larger than 0.3 but smaller than 0.5, is observed in many tests (see Prelec, 1998, for 
a discussion)
2. In this paper we assume that p* belongs to [0.3,0.5]. So the fourth 
collection is ℘4 = {H,L,P,∅}. The existence of H and L is empirically supported by 
the common ratio paradox (Fact # 2), the comparison in the preference reversal (Fact 
# 1) and the pricing of lotteries (Fact # 3), where, in each of these tests, one can 
observe a different way of judging the probabilities that belong to H and L.  
 
Each element pi or xi or each set of these elements has a vector of qualities denoted 
Q(•) = (q1,q2,q3,q4) where the set qj ∈ ℘j. The set qj associated with one pi or xi is 
the intersection of all sets of ℘j that contains this pi or xi. For example, the  
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probability pi = 1 belongs to the next four sets of ℘3 that are S, R∪S, S∪I, and P. 
Then S ∩ (R∪S) ∩ (S∪I) ∩ P = S and the q3 of pi = 1 is S. S is the smallest set 
included in all other sets. When there is no such a set, then qj = ∅. For example, the 
q2 of any probability is ∅, because a probability cannot have monetary values. Any 
set of probabilities or monetary amounts is denoted Θ
n where the superscript n = 
1,2,… identifies the different sets used in the Optimal Process (to be defined). The 
vector of qualities of the set Θ
n is denoted Q(Θ
n). Sometimes when it is pertinent we 
write each element of the set rather than Θ
n. The j
th quality of Q(Θ
n) is the union of 
the qj of each element of Θ
n. 
 
Definition 1: Vector of Qualities 
1.1)  Q(pi) = (P,∅,q3,q4) where pi ∈q3 ∈{R, S, I} and pi ∈ q4 ∈{H, L}. 
1.2)  Q(xi) = (X,q2,∅,∅) where xi ∈q2 ∈ {X
+, X
–} or q2 = ∅ if xi = 0. 
1.3)  The j
th quality of Q(Θ
n) is the union of the j
th quality of elements pi and xi. 
 
Example 3.1 
Suppose we have three probabilities .2, .6, and 1. The vectors of qualities of 
these probabilities are Q(.2) = (P,∅, R, L), Q(.6) = (P,∅, R, H), and Q(1) = 
(P,∅, S, H), respectively. For the set {.2,.6}, Q(.2,.6) = (P∪P, ∅∪∅, R∪R, 
H∪L) = (P,∅,R,P) and Q(.6,1) = (P∪P, ∅∪∅, R∪S, H∪H) = (P,∅,R∪S,H). 
 
A partition of a set Θ
n is a collection of disjoint subsets of Θ
n whose union is all of 
Θ
n. In this paper, the partitions of Θ
n are always composed of two sets denoted Θ
2n, 
Θ
2n+1  ≠ ∅. Figure 1 shows the first partition considered in Example 3.2. 
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                                              Θ
1 = {0.2,10,1,5} 
 
                         Θ
2 = {0.2,10}                           Θ
3 = {1,5}               
Figure 1: The partition of Θ







Suppose an individual faces a lottery (0.2,10) and a sure monetary amount 
(1,5). We then have the set Θ
1 = {0.2,10,1,5}. Q(0.2) and Q(1) are defined as in 
Example 3.1 and Q(10) = Q(5) = (X,X
+,∅,∅). Then the vector associated with 
the first lottery Q(Θ
2) = Q(0.2,10) = (P∪X,X
+,R,L) and the one associated with 
the sure monetary amount Q(Θ
3) = Q(1,5) = (P∪X,X
+,S,W). These vectors take 
into account every quality of each lottery. For example, they indicate that the 
first lottery (0.2,10) has the quality P∪X and this lottery has a positive 
monetary amount X
+ and is risky (R) while the second lottery is sure (S). The 
individual can also form other partitions from the set Θ
1 = {0.2,10,1,5} by 
grouping the two probabilities together and the two monetary amounts together 
which yields Q(Θ
2) = Q(0.2,1) = (P,∅,R∪S,P) and Q(Θ




Two vectors of qualities Q(Θ
2n) and Q(Θ
2n+1) can be more or less different. We use 
the intersection of the two vectors of qualities Q(Θ
2n) ∩ Q(Θ
2n+1) = ( 2n
1 q ∩ 2n 1
1 q + , 
2n
2 q ∩ 2n 1
2 q + ,  2n
3 q ∩ 2n 1
3 q + ,  2n
4 q ∩ 2n 1
4 q + ) in order to judge how different the vectors 
of qualities are where the j
th quality of Θ
n is denoted qj
n. The lexicographic order 
relation  p L allows the comparison of these vectors of qualities in ℘1 x℘2 x℘3 
x℘4. In the next definition, A ⊂ B means that A is a proper subset of B (i.e. A ≠ B). 
  
  12
Definition 2: Lexicographic order relation 
A relation p L on ℘1 x℘2 x℘3 x℘4 is defined as Q(Θ
2n) ∩ Q(Θ
2n+1) p L Q(Θ
2m) ∩ 
Q(Θ
2m+1), if there exists a ĵ such that ( 2n
ˆ J
q ∩ 2n 1
ˆ J
q + ) ⊂ ( 2m
ˆ J
q ∩ 2m 1
ˆ J
q + ) and, for all j < 
ĵ, ( 2n
j q ∩ 2n 1
j q + ) = ( 2m
j q ∩ 2m 1




2n+1)  p L Q(Θ
2m) ∩ Q(Θ
2m+1), we observe that the vectors 
Q(Θ
2n) and Q(Θ
2n+1) are more different than the vectors Q(Θ
2m) and Q(Θ
2m+1). We 
will conclude that the sets Θ
2n and Θ
2n+1 are also more different than the sets Θ
2m 
and Θ
2m+1. For a partition of Θ
n into two sets, the more homogeneous their elements, 
the more the two sets will differ. p L is nonreflexive and transitive, but it is a partial 




For the probabilities of Example 3.1, we have Q(0.2) ∩ Q(0.6) = 
(P∩P,∅∩∅,R∩R,L∩H) = (P,∅,R,∅) and Q(0.6) ∩ Q(1) = (P,∅,∅,H). Then 
(P,∅,∅,H) p L (P,∅,R,∅) since P=P, ∅ = ∅ and ∅ ⊂ R. So 0.6 and 1 are more 
different than 0.6 and 0.2 because in {0.6,1} one probability is risky (R) and 
the other probability is sure (S) while in {0.2,0.6} the two probabilities are 
risky (R) and the set contains more similar elements. 
 
Because we use the lexicographic order relation, the positions of the qualities in the 
vectors are important. The most natural difference between qualities is the one 
between probabilities (P) and monetary amounts (X). This is why this difference is 
the first one,  2n
1 q ∩ 2n 1
1 q + , considered in the vector of qualities ( 2n
1 q ∩ 2n 1
1 q + , 
2n
2 q ∩ 2n 1
2 q + ,  2n
3 q ∩ 2n 1
3 q + ,  2n
4 q ∩ 2n 1
4 q + ). Moreover, in lottery tests, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) have reported a very significant effect for the difference between 
a positive quality (X
+) and a negative (X
−) one for monetary amounts. So this  
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difference becomes the second important one,  2n
2 q ∩ 2n 1
2 q + . Finally, according to 
different test results, the difference between the qualities of S, I and R already 
pointed out in the literature  seems more significant than the one between the 
qualities of H and L, suggested in this article. In the remainder of this article, we 
will keep this order based on empirical tests. However, any other order is possible 
and, for example, some agents may find that H and L (0.9 vs 0.2) are more different 
than R and S (0.9 vs 1). 
 
 
4.  Optimal process and evaluation of lottery 
 
With the help of the two preceding definitions of vector of qualities and 
lexicographic order relation p L, we are now able to define an optimal process and to 
evaluate lotteries. 
 
4.1 Optimal  Process 
 
An optimal process (OP) is obtained by comparing partitions of sets of elements pi 
and xi in a recursive manner. We obtain an OP by first ranking partitions of the first 
set Θ
1. Then each set of the partition is split into other partitions and so on. We use 
the lexicographic order relation (Definition 2) to compare the intersection of the 
vector of qualities of each pair of sets (Q(Θ
2n) ∩ Q(Θ
2n+1)) since the more the two 
sets differ the more similar the elements contained in each. Payne et al. (1993) 
pointed out that it is more complex to evaluate two different elements (p1 and x1 for 
example) than to compare two similar elements (p1 and p2, for example). 
 
However, all partitions are not admissible in an OP. As we have seen, each set must 
be different from the empty set. We must also take into account the natural link  
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between an xi and its corresponding probability pi to prevent non−natural judgments 
such as comparing p1 and x2, for example. Because these problems occur when there 
are more than two elements of the same lottery in the set Θ
n, we then constrain the 
elements pi and xi to the same set of the partition of Θ
n. So the constraint is used 
when #(Θ
n ∩ li) > 2 (where # means cardinality and li, as defined in Section 2, is the 
set of the elements of a lottery) 
 
Definition 3: Admissible Partition 
An admissible partition of Θ
n is a two–set partition {Θ
2n, Θ
2n+1} such that Θ
2n, Θ
2n+1 
≠ ∅. If there is an li such that #(Θ
n
   ∩ li ) > 2 then all couples pi, xi ∈ Θ
n will belong 
to the same set of the partition of Θ
n. 
 
An Optimal Process is a series of partitions where each partition is ranked in the 
sense of Definition 2 and the sets of admissible partitions is constrained as in 
Definition 3. The first set considered is the union of elements of the two lotteries. 
 
Definition 4: Optimal Process (OP) 
An OP for a set Θ
1* = l1 ∪ l2 is a collection of sets {Θ
1*,…,Θ
n*,…}. The sets Θ
2n*, 
Θ
2n+1* belong to the OP if and only if {Θ
2n*, Θ








2n+1} is any other 








  ∩  li)  ≤ 2 for i = 1,2, we use the set 
{0.2,35,0.6,10} without the restriction in Definition 3. We have Q(0.2) = 
(P,∅,R,L), Q(0.6) = (P,∅,R,H) and Q(10) = Q(35) = (X,X
+,∅,∅). Moreover 
Q(0.6,0.2) = (P,∅,R,P) and Q(10,35) = (X,X
+,∅,∅).  
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If we consider different admissible sets of two elements, the partition 
{{0.6,0.2},{10,35}} is optimal since Q(0.6,0.2) ∩ Q(10,35) = (∅,∅,∅,∅) 
p L (X∪P,X
+,R,∅) = Q(0.6,10) ∩ Q(0.2,35) = Q(0.2,10) ∩ Q(0.6,35). If we 
now consider any admissible partition where one set contains one element 
and the other three elements, the partition {{0.6,0.2},  {10,35}} is still 
optimal because there is no other partition that yields (∅,∅,∅,∅). For 
example Q(0.2) ∩ Q(0.8,10,35) = (P,∅,R,∅) and then for the first quality ∅ 
⊂ P. Finally, for the set {0.6,0.2} the optimal partition is {{0.6},{0.2}}and 
for {10,35} the partition is {{10},{35}}. 
 
As we shall see in Section 5, for all lottery tests considered in this paper, an OP 
exists and is unique (see note 4). 
 
4.2 Lottery  evaluation 
 
In this section we emphasize the role of qualities in the evaluation of lotteries. From 
an OP the agent already knows the collection of sets {Θ
1*,...,Θ
n*,...}. He must now 
evaluate the set Θ
n*, taking the values of its two subsets Θ
2n*,Θ
2n+1*while 
considering the qualities. 
 
The optimal partition {Θ
2n*, Θ
2n+1*} of a set Θ
n* (#Θ
n* > 2) selected from a set of 
admissible partitions is the one that has the first j such that  2n* 2n 1*
jj qq + ≠  (see note 
4). In fact, the agent selects the partition that has the most important qualitative 




Definition 5.1: Value of sets with more than one element 
v(Θ
n*) =  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq J + (v(Θ
2n*),v(Θ
2n+1*): RxR→ R where for all j such that 
2n* 2n 1*
jj qq +  ≠ ∅, J = max j such that for all j < J,  2n* 2n 1*
jj qq + = . 
 
When an agent evaluates a set Θ




 he will select the first two qualities of each of the subsets Θ
2n*, Θ
2n+1* that are 
different when such qualities do exist. In the above definition, the value of Θ
n* is 
v(Θ
n*) =  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq J +  (v(Θ
2n*), v(Θ
2n+1*) where the value  of the two subsets are 
judged by considering the optimal qualities  2n*
j q  and  2n 1*
j q + . 
 
Example 4.2 
For the comparison of lotteries (0.2,35) and (0.6,10) in Example 4.1, we 
obtained the partition Θ
2* = {0.2,0.6} and Θ
3* = {10,35}. By Definition 1, 
Q(0.2) = (P,∅,R,L), Q(0.6) = (P,∅,R,H) and since P = P, ∅=∅ and R = R, 
the first different qualities are H and L. Then, from Definition 5.1, we have 
JHL(0.6,0.2) and the agent considers these qualities while judging 0.6 and 
0.2. The agent can also evaluate the monetary amounts. Since Q(10) = 
Q(35) = (X,X
+,∅,∅), all qualities are equal and by Definition 5.1, the agent 
rules out the ∅ and selects the last ones X
+. So we have JX+X+(10,35). 
Finally, to obtain v(Θ
1*) the agent considers Q(0.6,0.2) = (P,∅,R,P) and 
Q(10,35) = (X,X
+,∅,∅). Since P and X are the first different qualities we 
have v(Θ
1*) = JPX (JHL(0.6,0.2), JX+X+(10,35)). This means that the agent 
judges the two monetary amounts together and the two probabilities 
together. Then he makes a third judgment considering the qualities P and X. 
 
It remains to discuss the values of a single element pi or xi. Like Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), we consider the particular role of the next two boundaries for  
  17
probabilities 0 and 1. The corresponding boundary of a pi noted bpi is 0 if pi < p* or 
1 if not. As the monetary amount 0 has no quality in℘2 (i.e. q2 = ∅) there is no need 
for a boundary for xi 
 and v(xi) = xi.
5 
 
Some theories use an evaluation function like w(pi) in NEU or use directly the value 
of the elements like pi in EU. So we must include this possibility of a 
single−element judgment in our model. In particular Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
and Prelec (1998) have pointed out that the shape of the w(p) function reflects the 
qualitative difference between the boundaries and the other probabilities. In the 
same spirit, judgments of one probability with its corresponding boundary are 
allowed. However, these judgments with a boundary will be used only when they 
are optimal for the agent. The lexicographic order relation p L of Definition 2 sets 
whether the boundaries are used or not. 
 
A boundary is optimal for judging a probability if there is an element pi ∈ S of a set 
{pi,θ} that is less different from its corresponding boundary bpi than from the other 
element θ, where θ is either a probability or a monetary amount. In fact, θ is the 
element of Θ
1* which is most similar to pi, among those that can be judged with pi in 
the OP. Then, like the OP that leads to judgments with a similar element, the use of 
boundaries also leads to judgments with a more similar element for pi. When a 
boundary bpi is used, the judgment of (pi,bpi) is as in Definition 5.1 and the value of 
pi is v(pi) =  p b
J J qq J (pi,bpi): RxR→R, where  p
J q  and  b
J q  are the first different qualities 
of pi and bpi. 
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Definition 5.2: Value of elements pi 
v(pi) =  p b
J J qq J (pi , bpi) if and only if there is a set Θ
n* = {pi,θ} ∈ OP and pi ∈ R, such 
that Q(pi) ∩ Q(θ) p L Q(pi) ∩ Q(bpi). v(pi) = pi otherwise. 
 
Example 4.3 
Suppose the lottery (0.8,10) and b0.8 is 1 since 0.8 > p*. Then Q(0.8) ∩ 
Q(10) = (∅,∅,∅,∅)p L (P,∅,R∩S,H) = Q(0.8) ∩ Q(1). So the boundary 1 





We now present in Table 1 results that derive the judgments of the optimal processes 
associated with eleven tests found in the literature. As we shall see, they correspond 
to the fourteen facts listed in Section 2. The other possible tests are a combination of 
these eleven tests. The proofs are in the Appendix and their implications are 
discussed in Section 5.1. 
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
5.1  Examples and discussion 
 
We now discuss the facts (JCE, CCE, common ratio, preference reversal …) along 
with the judgments obtained in Table 1 with numerical examples. Without loss of 
generality, a simple way to take qualities into account when evaluating a lottery is to 
modify the judgment function by introducing a parameter  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq + α  that multiplies 
the value of one set v(Θ
2n*), while letting the value of the other v(Θ
2n+1*) unchanged. 
The judgment  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq J + (v(Θ
2n*),v(Θ
2n+1*)) becomes J( 2n* 2n 1*




2n+1*)). The choice of the set does not matter, so the parameter could multiply 
v(Θ
2n+1*) instead of v(Θ
2n*). In this paper, we focus on the qualities in (i) and (ii) 
below. For all other qualities  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq + α  is equal to 1. From Table 1, we observe, in 
the last column, the qualities associated with each judgment function. The 
corresponding  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq + α  and Θ
2n* are either: 
i) αX+X–, αHL, or αRS, αRI when Θ
2n* has respectively the qualities X
–, H or R. 
ii) αHH, αLL, when Θ
2n* contains the largest pi. 
 
In order to emphasize the role of qualities and remain close to the other models in 
the literature, the evaluation of a lottery (1,x1; p2,x2–x1) is represented by: 
 
  Π1 x1 + Π2 p2 (x2–x1) (1) 
 
where  Π1 is the product of the parameter  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq + α  that multiplies the values 
v(Θ
2n*) of the OP, when 1 or x1 belong to Θ
2n*, and Π2 is the product of the 
parameter  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq + α  that multiplies the values v(Θ
2n*) of the OP, when p2 or (x2 – 
x1) belong to Θ
2n*. The role of each pertinent quality is then taken into account by 
Equation 1. Note that if qualities play no role all parameters  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq + α  = 1 and the 
model is reduced to expected utility with risk neutrality. Many functions  2n* 2n 1*
JJ qq J +  
(v(Θ
2n*), v(Θ
2n+1*)) can be used to obtain Equation (1) but we do not discuss all of 
them in this article since it is beyond its scope. An example of such function is 
presented in note 6. We now apply Equation 1 to the different tests. 
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Tests 1, 2 
 
The next example is about the comparison in the preference reversal paradox. In this 




In Tversky et al. (1990) we observe that 83% of the subjects choose (0.97,4) 
over (0.31,16). To explain the result we use the process of Test 1, so the 
judgments of the optimal process are JPX(JHL(p1, p2), JX+X+(x1,x2)). For the 
comparison of the two probabilities, the parameter αHL multiplies the highest 
probability 0.97 as we fixed above in (i) and Π2 = αHL. There is no other 
parameter, since αX+X+ and αPX are set equal to 1. For the evaluation of the first 
lottery, Equation 1 gives αHL (0.97 × 4) and for the second lottery we obtain 
(0.31×16). From the test result αHL (0.97 × 4) – (0.31×16) > 0 and αHL must be 
greater than 1.28 to obtain the desired result. We observe that the qualitative 
difference between elements of H and L increases the difference between the 
two pi, and Fact # 1 is explained. It is important to notice that the way we 
introduce the parameters does not affect the conclusion. If αHL would multiply 
the smallest probability 0.31 then αHL must be lower than 1/1.28 to explain the 
result. The parameter still increases the difference between probabilities. 
 
Example 5.2 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) test sequentially a choice between (0.45, 6000) 
and (0.90, 3000) and another choice between (0.001, 6000) and (0.002, 3000). 
86% of the subjects select the second lottery in the first task but 73% select the 
first lottery in the second task. This is the common ratio paradox. By using the 
same process of Example 5.1 with the parameter αHH, we obtain: αHH0.90 × 
3000 > 0.45 × 6000 and with the parameter αLL we obtain αLL0.002 × 3000 < 
0.001 × 6000 Consequently, we must have αHH > 1 > αLL to solve Fact # 2.  
  21
 
The next example is about the JCE (Fact # 3). 
 
Example 5.3 
Birnbaum et al. (1992) obtained that the JCE of the lottery (0.95,96) has a 
value around 70. From Table 1, the JCE for this type of lottery is obtained from 
Test 2, where the judgments of the OP are JPX(JRS(p1, bp1), x1).There is only 
one relevant parameter, since P and X are not taken into account by (i) and (ii). 
From JRS(p1, bp1), we have that αRS multiplies p1x1. We obtain αRS 0.95 × 96 = 
70, which implies that αRS = 0.77. For a small probability, the lottery is 
overestimated and then the αRI > 1. This solves Fact #3. Consequently, the 
judgment of probabilities with boundaries is similar to the inversed S–shape 
used by Prelec (1998), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996). See note 7. If we combine Test 2 and Test 1 (with the qualities of H 
and L), we explain the existence of the preference reversal paradox (Tversky et 
al. 1990). 
 
The use of qualities to obtain an OP for Test 2 leads to almost the same judgment of 
probabilities as the one in NEU. However, for this test, we use judgments with 
boundaries instead of the function w(pi). As the proof of Test 2 shows in Appendix, 
it is optimal, in our model, to judge a probability with a boundary to obtain the JCE. 
In contrast, in Test 1 the judgment with boundaries was not shown to be optimal, 
since no boundary satisfies the condition. An example of judgment of two pi is to be 
found in Ranyard (1995), where the subject says: “I’ve chosen option 2 because 
there’s more chance of winning a smaller amount…” Then the agent clearly 
compares the two chances of winning or the two probabilities according to Test 1. 
Consequently, qualities play an important role in defining an OP by allowing both 
kinds of judgment and by identifying when it is optimal to use one type of judgment 
(with a boundary) instead of the other (without a boundary).  
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The inverse S–shaped function w(pi) does not fit the data for the comparison of two 
probabilities with the risky quality. In fact, Alarie and Dionne (2001) show that a 
one parameter w(pi) function cannot take into account simultaneously the next three 
comparisons of lotteries: JLL(p1, p2), JHH(p1, p2) and JHL(p1, p2). Examples 5.1 and 5.2 
clearly show that the model presented in this paper can solve these three 
comparisons of lotteries. The judgments that consider HL along with both SR and 
IR are also very difficult to explain with the inverse S–shaped function w(pi). In 
summary, the above discussion uses five different judgment functions JRI(p1,0), 
JRS(p1,1), JHH(p1,p2), JLL(p1,p2) and JHL(p1,p2) to explain Fact #1 to Fact#3.  
 
Since the main tool for explaining paradoxes with positive monetary amounts is the 
judgment of probabilities, inverse results will then be obtained for negative 
monetary amounts. This explains Fact #6. 
 
Tests 3, 4 
 
Another important group of facts concerns the difference between the CCE and the 
JCE (Fact #3). Tversky et al. (1990) introduced the CCE in order to obtain a lottery 
price from a comparison with a sure monetary amount. As Bostic et al. (1990) have 
pointed out, this procedure is closer to the comparison of two lotteries than the JCE 




Test 3 and Test 4 are about Fact #5. The judgments of the optimal process are 
JPX(JRS(p1,1), JX+X+(x1,x2)) for Test 3 and the evaluation of the lottery is given 
by αRSp1x1 as in Test 2. So there is no difference between the JCE and the CCE 
for high probabilities.  
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The optimal process of Test 4 is JPX((JRS(JRI(p1,bp1),1), JX+X+(x1,x2)) and the 
evaluation of the lottery is given by αRS αRI p1x1 = CCE. The first parameter 
αRS comes from JRS(•) and the second αRI from JRI(•). If the agent now uses 
JCE instead of CCE for low probabilities, Test 2 implies that JCE = αRI p1x1 
and then CCE = αRSJCE. Since αRS < 1 the JCE is larger than the CCE. 
 
One can note that the reason why the use of the CCE decreases the number of 
reversals is not, in this paper, because the CCE is closer to the comparison of 
lotteries than the JCE. It is because there is an additional RxS effect: For p1 ∈ H, the 
judgment of p1 is with the probability 1 in both cases (Tests 2 and 3). However, for 
p1 ∈ L, when we test the CCE, the agent first judges the probability, as in the JCE, 
and compares the result to the sure probability which involves another judgment that 
considers the qualities R and S (Test 4). So JCE > CCE. 
 
Tests 5, 6, 7 
 
Test 5 gives an optimal way to compare a lottery where x1 > 0 with a lottery where 
x1 = 0. Note that, in all tests, (1,x1;p2,x2–x1) is preferred to (p2,x2) in a direct choice. 
This test result obtained by Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) is foreseeable since, for 
both lotteries, you can win x2 with probability p2 and you can win x1 with 
probability 1 − p2 for the first lottery and 0 with probability 1–p2 for the second one. 
Test 5 gives x1 + αRS p2(x2–x1) for the first lottery and, for the second one, αRS p2x2. 
So the difference in evaluation between the two lotteries is x1 − αRS p2x1 > 0. This is 
positive because both αRS and p2 are smaller than 1. This explains Fact #8. When we 
consider the pricing of these lotteries, Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) obtained the 




Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) obtained that JCE of (p2,x2 ) > JCE of (1,x1;p2,x2–
x1) for the lotteries (1,x1;p2,x2–x1) and (p2,x2) where x2 = 96, x1 = 24 and p2 = 
0.8. 
We now show that this contradictory result can be rationalized. This test result 
is difficult to accept intuitively because the expected value of the lottery with 
the higher JCE is lower than the one for the other lottery p2x2 < p2x2 + (1–p2)x1. 
In fact for the JCE of (p2,x2) we have αRS p2 x2, and for the JCE of (1,x1;p2,x2–
x1) we use Test 6 and obtain JRS(JPX(1,x1),JPX(JRS(p2,bp2),x2–x1)). So the 
evaluation of this lottery is x1 + αRS αRS p2(x2–x1). From Birnbaum and Sutton 
(1992) data, x1 = 24, x2 = 96 and p2 = 0.8. So we have (Fact #7) x1 + αRS αRS 
p2(x2–x1) < αRS p2x2 when αRS ∈]1/2,5/6[. This interval contains αRS = 0.77 
which corresponds to the value found for the test in Example 5.3 (Birnbaum et 
al., 1992). This result (Test 6), along with Test 5, involves a second reversal of 
preferences explained by the model. The first was explained by Tests 1 and 2 
together. 
For the lottery (1,24;p2,72) where the agent can win 96 with probability p2 and 
24 otherwise, Birnbaum and Sutton (1992)
8 pointed out that the JCE of 
(1,24;p2,72) is different from 24 + JCE of (p2,72). Moreover, the spread 
between the two JCE decreases when the probability increases (Fact # 9). We 
can explain this result by taking the derivative of (JCE of (1,x1;p2,x2–x1) – JCE 
of (p2,x2 –x1)) with respect to p2 where p2 ∈ H. The difference between the two 
JCE is equal to x1 + αRS αRS p2(x2–x1) – αRS p2(x2–x1) and the derivative with 
respect to p2 yields (αRS – 1) αRS (x2–x1) < 0, since αRS < 1 and x2 > x1 > 0. For 
p2 ∈ L we obtain (αRS – 1) αRI (x2–x1) < 0 since αRI > 1 and αRS < 1. 
 
One can note that we have a comparison with the boundaries as in the cases where 
x1 = 0. This is the reason why the evaluation of these lotteries as a function of p2 still 
has an inverse S–shaped curve, as discussed in footnote 7 (Fact # 9). 
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When xi, xi–1 > 0 and pi ∈ L, the process for Test 7 gives CCE= x1 + αRS αRI p2(x2–
x1). Test 6 gives JCE = x1 + αRS αRI p2(x2–x1) and CCE = JCE for low probabilities. 
We have the same result when pi ∈ W. Then, for this type of lottery, there is no 
difference between JCE and CCE for all probabilities (Fact #10). 
 
Tests 8, 9, 10, 11 
 
These tests consider lotteries where xi–1 < 0 < xi. We first discuss the JCE and CCE. 
The judgments of Tests 8, 10 and 11 are: 
 
Test 8)   JX–X+(JPX(1,–x1), ((JPX(JRS(p2,bp2), x2+x1)) 
Test 10)  JX–X+(JPX(1,–x1), ((JPX(JRS(p2,1), JX+X+(x2+x1,x3))) 
Test 11)  JX–X+( JPX(1,–x1), JPX(JRS(JRI(p2,bp2), 1), JX+X+(x3, x2+x1))) 
 
For these three OP, the judgment JX–X+ has two parts. The first ones JPxX(1,–x1) are 
the same for all processes and only the second parts differ. These second parts are 
identical to those of Tests 2, 3, and 4 respectively, where a monetary amount is 
equal to 0. So, for p2 ∈ W, the JCE = CCE (Test 8 vs Test 10) and, for p2 ∈ L, the 
JCE ≠ CCE (Test 8 with the boundary 0 vs Test 11) for the same reasons that apply 
for those used to explain Tests 2, 3 and 4. This explains why the test results obtained 
by Bostic et al. (1990) are the same as those in Fact #14 (Tversky et al., 1990). 
 
Bostic et al. (1990) and Luce et al. (1993) use four pairs of lotteries taken from 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). These tests are very difficult to explain since, 
contrary to the cases where x1 = 0 or x1 > 0 (Facts #7 and #8), the reversal does not 
occur systematically. So the value of each parameter is important. These tests also 
provide an opportunity to check if the values of the parameters obtained from all 




For the comparison of pairs of lotteries in Bostic et al. (1990), we use Test 9 
JX+X–(JPX(JHH(1,1),JX–X–(–x1,–x3)), JPX(JHL(p2,p4), JX+X+(x2+x1, x4+x3))). For the 
parameter that takes into account the difference between a positive and a 
negative monetary amount, Tversky and Kahneman obtained a value around 
2.25. So we use αX+X– = 2.25. We also use αHL = 1.19, since this is the average 
of the 14 tests in Tversky et al. (1990). We set 1/αRI = αRS = 0.77, which 
corresponds to the values in the preceding examples. For the comparison (Test 
9), we have αX+X– (x2–x3) + p2(x2–x1) – αHL p4(x4–x3). The JCE (Test 8) for 
lotteries with low probabilities and high probabilities are respectively: 
αX+X– xi–1 + αRI pi(xi–xi–1) 
αX+X– xi–1 + αRS pi(xi–xi–1) 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the four cases where in each case A–B measures the 
difference between the lotteries A and B when they are compared. For these lotteries 
you can win x1 with probability p1 and x2 with probability 1–p1. 
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
So the lottery with the x1 (x1  < 0) closer to 0 is always selected in a direct 
comparison (Fact #12) and the reversals occur for lotteries 1 and 4 (Fact #13). The 
parameters we use fit the data well, in particular αX+X– = 2.25 taken from Tversky 





We have seen that the concept of qualities is useful in two different ways. First the 
qualities settle the optimal process and, second, they are taken explicitly into 
account in the judgments. So the role played by qualities seems strong enough to 
justify the necessity of using them. As shown in Section 5, they serve as a powerful 
instrument in solving the fourteen facts in the literature (Section 2), which are the 
most significant for two–point lotteries. 
 
This model can be extended to n point lotteries. Another way to continue the 
research is to try to explain the difference between the buying and selling prices. 
Ambiguity is another interesting problem and the explanations of these last two 
problems seem to be closely related.  
  28
Notes 
1.  For x1 < 0 < x 2 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) do not use segregation. This 
procedure of doing would not affect the result of this paper. Perhaps the best way 
is not to use segregation when x1 and x2 have almost the same size and to use it 
when they are very different. 
2.  p* is such that for p∈]0,1[ w(p) < p if p > p* and w(p) > p if p < p*. 
3.  For the partition Θ
1 = {p1,x1,x2} and Θ
2 = {p2}, the first quality of Q(Θ
1) ∩ 
Q(Θ
2) is P and  for the partition Θ
3 = {x1,p1,p2} and Θ
4 = {x2} the first quality of 
Q(Θ
3) ∩ Q(Θ
4) is X. So X⊄P, P⊄X and P≠X and comparability fails. 
4.  There exists a unique OP, because for each set considered there is only one 
optimal partition. When #Θ
n = 2 the result is obvious. When #(Θ
n ∩ li) > 2 each 
set contains at least one element pi and one xi and the first quality is P∪X for 
each set. So if some elements have the quality X
– and others have X
+ then 
putting each xi in one set according to these qualities is optimal. If all xi have the 
same quality then splitting them into two sets, according to R and S qualities, is 
optimal. This last splitting is always possible, since when a lottery has more than 
two elements there is always one pi with the quality R and another one with the 
quality S. So only one optimal partition is obtained by considering the first 
different qualities. 
When #(Θ
n ∩ li) ≤ 2 and #Θ
n > 2 there is always at least one pi and one xi. Since 
there is no restriction, splitting by using the first different qualities P and X will 
be optimal. 
5.  We make this assumption to emphasize the role of probabilities. This is 
equivalent to assuming a linear utility function. This procedure simplifies the 
discussion. In other words, a non−linear  u(xi) function (obtained from a 
judgment with another boundary xi= 0, pointed out in Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)) would not affect the results in this paper. However, as in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), there is a difference between strictly positive and strictly 
negative monetary amounts. 
6.  Many other judgment functions can lead to Equation 1. For example, in the 
absence of qualities, when a lottery A is compared to a lottery B we can have: 
1)  J
1(pi,xi) = sgn pixi. sgn = + if pi and xi ∈ A and sgn = – if not. 
2)  J
2(p1,p2) = (p1–p2) (x1 + x2)/2 when p1 ∈ A and p2 ∈ B. 
3)  J








2) > 1. 
5)  J
5(pi, bpi) = pi 
The first equation is standard, while when we put together the result of (2) and 
(3) by using (4) we obtain p1x1–p2x2. So these judgments lead to expressions 
with terms pixi even though the agent is allowed to compare two pi or two xi and  
  29
the evaluation of a lottery is given by Σpixi. In Equation 5, the pi is judged by 
considering the boundary, in order to obtain a judged value of pi. Other functions 
could be used, such as J
2(p1,p2) = p1/p2, for example. To obtain Equation 1, we 
consider qualities by taking into account (i) and (ii). The average of xi used in (2) 
and the one of pi used in (3) is also obtained by considering qualities. 
7.  As Prelec (1998) has pointed out, the closer the probabilities are to boundaries 
the greater the effect of RS or RI. We can take this fact into account by setting: 
αRS(p*)=1 and dαRI/dp < 0 for p < p* dαRS/dp > 0 for p > p*. The same idea 
could be applied to other parameters such as αHH for example. 
8.  They use the seller’s point of view and not the neutral’s one, but the result 
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Let (p1,x1) be compared to (p2,x2), where Q(p1) = (P,∅,R,H) = Q(p2). Then the 
judgments of the optimal process are JPX(JHH(p1, p2), JX+X+(x1,x2)). 
Proof: Since #(Θ
1 ∩ lk) = 2 there is no restriction, except the one where a set must 
not be equal to the empty set. Let the partition {{p1,p2}, {x1,x2}} then Q(p1,p2) ∩ 
Q(x1,x2) = (P,∅,R,H)  ∩ (X,X
+,∅,∅) = (∅,∅,∅,∅). For all other partitions that 
consider sets of two elements, we have that the intersection is equal to 
(X∪P,X
+,R,H) and (∅,∅,∅,∅)p L (X∪P,X
+,R,H). For partitions where one set 
contains one element, the q1 is different from ∅ and none of these partitions are 
chosen. We have Q(p1,p2) = (P,∅,R,H) and Q(x1,x2) = (X,X
+,∅,∅) and since P≠X, 
we use JPX(·).Since Q(p1,p2)  p L Q(pi,bpi) for all i, we do not use the boundaries. 
Since Q(p1) = Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,H), we use JHH(p1,p2). Since Q(x1) = Q(x2) = 
(X,X
+,∅,∅), we use JX+X+(x1,x2).    
 
Test 2 
Suppose (p1,x1) has to be evaluated where Q(p1) = (P,∅,R,H). Then the judgments 
of the optimal process are JPX(JRS(p1,bp1), x1). 
Proof: There is only one partition {{p1},{x1}}. We have Q(p1) = (P,∅,R,H) and 
Q(x1) = (X,X
+,∅,∅) and since P≠X, we use JPX(·). Since Q(p1,bp1) = (P,∅,P,H) p   L 
(P∪X,X
+,R,H) = Q(p1,x1) we use boundaries. Since Q(p1) = (P,∅,R,H) and Q(1) = 
(P,∅,S,H) we use JRS(p1,bp1). The value of x1 is x1 and we obtain JPX(JRS(p1,bp1),x1).
    
 
Test 3 
Let a lottery (p1,x1) be compared to a sure monetary amount (1,x2), where Q(p1) = 
(P,∅,R,H). Then the judgments of the optimal process are JPX(JRS(p1,1), JX+X+(x1,x2). 
Proof: The partition {{p1,1},  {x1,x2}} i s  o p t i m a l  a s  i n  T e s t  1 .  S i n c e  Q ( p 1,1) = 
Q(p1,bp1) we do not use boundaries. The judgments are the same as the ones in Test 




Let a lottery (p1,x1) be compared to a sure monetary amount (1,x2), where Q(p1) = 
(P,∅,R,L). Then the judgments of the optimal process are JPX(JX+X+(x1,x2), 
(JSR(JRI(p1,bp1), 1). 
Proof: As in test 1, the optimal partition is {{1,p1},{x1,x2}}. The optimal qualities 
for the probabilities are RS and X
+X
+ for the monetary amounts. Since Q(p1) ∩ Q(1) 
= (P,∅,∅,∅) p L (P,∅,∅,L) = Q(p1) ∩ Q(bp1), we use the boundary. We have Q(p1) 
= (P,∅,R,L) and Q(bp1) = (P,∅,I,L) so the qualities used are I and R.    
 
Test 5 
Let (1,x1;p2,x2–x1) be compared to (p3,x3), where Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,H) = Q(p3). Then 
the judgments of the optimal process are JSR(JPX(1, x1), (JPX(JHH(p2, p3), JX+X+(x3,x2–
x1)). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, each pi and xi belong to the same set. 
Since Q(1,x1)  ∩ Q(p2,x2–x1,p3,x3) = (X∪P,X
+,∅,H)  p L (X∪P,X
+,R,H) = 
Q(1,x1,p3,x3)  ∩ Q(p2,x2–x1) = Q(1,x1,p2,x2–x1)  ∩ Q(p3,x3) the first partition is 
optimal. The partition of {p2,x2–x1,p3,x3} is as in Test 1 and there is only one 
partition for {1,x1}. We use the qualities R and S for the judgment of these two sets 
together.    
 
Test 6 
Suppose (1,x1;p2,x2–x1) has to be evaluated where Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the 
judgments of the optimal process are JRS(JPX(1, x1), ((JPX(JRI(p2, bp2), x2–x1)). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, pi and xi belong to the same set and 
we have only one admissible partition {{1,x1},{p2,x2–x1}}. Since Q(1,x1) = 
(P∪X,X
+,S,H) and Q(p2,x2–x1) = (P∪X,X
+,R,L), we use the qualities R and S. The 
boundary is used to obtain the value of p2.    
 
Test 7 
Let (1,x1;p2,x2–x1) be compared to (1,x3), where Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the 
judgments of the optimal process are JRS(JPX(JHH(1,1),JX+X+(x1,x3)), JPX(JRI(p2,bp2), 
x2–x1). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, pi and xi belong to the same set. 
Q(1,1,x1,x3)  ∩ Q(p2,x2–x1) = (X∪P,X
+,∅,∅)  p L (X∪P,X
+,S,H) = Q(1,x1)  ∩ 
Q(1,x3,p2,x2–x1) = Q(1,x3) ∩ Q(1,x1,p2,x2–x1).The partition of the first set is as in 




Suppose (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1) has to be evaluated and Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,H). Then the 
judgments of the optimal process are JX–X+(JPX(1, –x1), ((JPX(JRS(p2, bp2), x2+x1)). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, pi and xi belong to the same set and 
there is only one partition. Since Q(1,–x1) = (P∪X,X
–,S,H) and Q(p2,x2+x1) = 
(P∪X,X
+,R,H) we use the qualities of X
+ and X
–. The boundaries are used for p2.    
 
Test 9 
Let (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1) be compared to (1,–x3;p4,x4+x3), where Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,L) and 
Q(p4) = (P,∅,R,H). Then the judgments of the optimal process are JX–X+(JPX(JHH(1, 
1),JX–X–(–x1,–x3)), (JPX(JLH(p2, p4), JX+X+(x2+x1, x4+x3))). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, pi and xi belong to the same set. We 
have that the partition {{p4, p2,x4+x3,x2+x1}, {1,1,–x1,–x2}} is optimal since this is 
the only partition where the intersection implies q2 = ∅. The partition of each set is 
as in Test 1. Since Q(1,1,–x1,–x2) = (P∪X,X
–,S,H), and Q(p4, p2,x4+x3,x2+x1) = 
(P∪X,X
+,R,L) we use the qualities of X
+ and X
–.    
 
Test 10 
Let (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1) be compared to (1,x3), where Q(p2) =(P,∅, R,H). Then the 
judgments of the optimal process are JX–X+(JPX(1,–x1), ((JPX(JRS(p2,1), 
JX+X+(x2+x1,x3))). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, pi and xi belong to the same set and 
the partition {1,–x1} and {p2,x2+x1, 1,x3} is optimal. The partition of the second set 
is as in Test 3.    
 
Test 11 
Let (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1) be compared to (1,x3) where Q(p2) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the 
judgments of the optimal process are JX–X+(JPX(1,–x1), JRS(JPX(1,x3), JPX(JRI(p2,bp2), 
x2+x1)). 
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, pi and xi belong to the same set. We 
have that{1,–x1} and {p2,x2+x1, 1,x3} is optimal since (P∪X,∅,S,H)  p L 
(P∪X,X
+,∅,∅) which is the one of {1,–x1,1,x3} and {p2,x2+x1}. The partition of the 




This table lists the 11 tests used to explain the 14 facts documented in Section 2. 
Lottery 1 is compared to Lottery 2 in eight tests or is priced in Tests 2,6,8 (neutral case in Birnbaum et al. 1992). 
Tests  Facts  Lottery 1  Lottery 2  Judgments of Optimal Processes 
1) Tversky et al. (1990)  1,2,4,6  (p1,x1), p1 ∈L (p2,x2), p2 ∈H  JPX(JHL(p1,p2), JX+X+(x1,x2)) 
2) Birnbaum et al. (1992)  3,6,7  (p1,x1), p1 ∈H    JPX(JRS(p1,bp1),x1) 
3) Tversky et al. (1992)  5,6  (p1,x1), p1 ∈H  (1,x2)  JPX(JRS(p1,1), JX+X+(x1,x2)) 
4) Tversky et al. (1992)  5,6  (p1,x1), p1 ∈L  (1,x2)  JPX(JRS(JRI(p1,bp1),1), JX+X+(x1,x2)) 
5) Birnbaum and Sutton 
(1992) 
8  (1,x1;p2,x2–x1), p2 ∈H (p3,x3), p3 ∈H  JRS(JPX(1,x1),JPX(JHH(p2,p3), JX+X+(x3,x2–x1)) 
6) Birnbaum et al. (1992)  7,9,10  (1,x1;p2,x2–x1), p2 ∈L   J RS(JPX(1,x1), JPX(JRI(p2,bp2), x2–x1)) 
7) Birnbaum (1992)  10  (1,x1;p2,x2–x1), p2 ∈L  (1,x3)  JRS(JPX(JHH(1,1),JX+X+(x1,x3), JPX(JRI(p2,bp2), x2–x1)) 
8) Lichtenstein and Slovic 
(1971) 
11,13, 14 (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1), p2 ∈H   JX–X+(JPX(1,–x1), JPX(JRS(p2,bp2), (x2+x1)) 
9) Lichtenstein and Slovic 
(1971) 
12,13  (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1), p2 ∈L (1,–x3;p4,x4+x3), 
p4 ∈H 
JX–X+(JPX(JHH(1,1),JX–X–(–x1,–x3)), JPX(JLH(p2, p4), 
JX+X+(x2+x1, x4+x3))) 
10) Bostic et al. (1990)  14  (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1), p2 ∈H (1,x3)  JX–X+(JPX(1, –x1), JPX(JRS(p2,1), JX+X+(x2+x1,x3))) 
11) Bostic et al (1990)  14  (1,–x1;p2,x2+x1), p2 ∈L (1,x3)  JX–X+( JPX(1,–x1), JPX(JRS(JRI(p2,bp2),1) JX+X+(x3, x2+x1))  
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Table 2 
Gambles used by Luce et al. (1993) 
Case  x1 p 1 x 2  A−B  JCE Reversal 
1A 16  0.3056  –1.5  3.58 




2A 9  0.1944  –0.5  1.28 




3A 6.5  0.5000  –1.0  0.64 




4A 8.5  0.3889  –1.5  1.68 





Contrary to the case where x1 = 0 and x2  > 0, the reversals do not occur 
systematically. The calibration of the parameters obtained from other tests 
explains the reversals for lottery pairs 1 and 4 and consistent preferences for 
pairs 2 and 3, where αHH = αHL = 1.19. 